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On 25 September 2019, the Italian Constitutional Court (ICC) has made clear that
assisted suicide is not punishable under specific conditions. The judgment came one
year after the ICC had ordered the Italian Parliament to legislate on the matter – which it
did not do. The entire story is indicative of the inability of Parliaments to respond to
social demands as well as the current trend of high courts to act as shepherds of
parliaments rather than as guardians of the constitution.
A case of strategic litigation
The constitutional question was raised by the case of Fabiano Antoniani, known as DJ
Fabo, who was left quadriplegic and blind after a car accident in 2014. His physical
conditions were extremely severe and deemed irreversible:  he needed artificial support
for nutrition and respiration and suffered from terrible pain and frequent convulsions
and muscle spasms. His case and situation generated an intense public debate, reaching
its apex when he decided to get assisted suicide in Switzerland where, unlike in Italy, it
was legal under certain conditions. The politician Marco Cappato, a member of the
radical party, drove him to a Swiss clinic where the assisted suicide was carried out and
turned himself in to the police after he had returned to Italy. His self-reporting was
aimed at opening a case for strategic litigation, with the objective of challenging the
constitutionality of the criminal implication of his help to carry out the assisted suicide.
His plan of strategic litigation succeeded, as Cappato was charged with the crime
punishable under article 580 of the criminal code (“Helping someone to commit suicide,
or to convince someone to commit suicide, is punishable with a sentence between 5 and
12 years”) before a Court in Milan submitted a question of constitutionality to the ICC.
This provision was challenged on the ground of its constitutionality by the ordinary
judge, who argued that this criminal regime violated the right to self-determination
contained in art. 2 and art. 13 of the Italian constitution.
A decision without a legal basis
In an unprecedented decision, and with no specific legal basis to adopt a decisional
arrangement that resembles the German BVerfG’s Unvereinbarkeitserklärung, the ICC
decided in October 2018 to suspend the proceedings and to accord the Parliament one
year to provide for a much-needed comprehensive regulation of the matter. The Court,
in a sort of interlocutory order, stated that “the current legal framework concerning the
end of life deprives specific situations … of adequate protection” and gave the
Parliament a one-year deadline to fill this legislative void. The ICC not only pushed the
Parliament to legislate, but also provided some specific guidelines. In fact, in its order,
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the ICC provided a rather detailed framework of factual conditions for the Parliament to
consider in the desired intervention. In particular, the Court referred to a “scenario in
which the assisted persons are (a) affected by an illness that is incurable and (b) causes
physical or psychological suffering, which they find absolutely intolerable, and who are
(c) kept alive by means of life support treatments, but remain (d) capable of making free
and informed decisions”. In these cases, according to the Court, criminalizing assisted
suicide had to be considered incompatible with the Constitution, also considering that in
similar scenarios existing legislation might already allow patients to decide that death
take its course. Under the recently approved Law no. 219 of 22 December 2017
(Provisions on informed consent and advance medical directives) patients may request
the interruption of the ongoing life-sustaining treatment and concurrent subjection to
heavy and constant sedation, with binding effect on third parties. In the case at hand,
however, the patient rejected the interruption of life-sustaining treatment with
simultaneous administration of heavy sedation because this solution would have led to
even more unbearable and durable pain. Indeed, since the patient did not depend totally
on a respirator, death would have occurred only after a considerable amount of time,
quantifiable in days. In the view of the patient, this would have been an undignified way
to end his life and his loved ones would have had to share in it on the emotional level.
However, in its order, the Court decided not to straightforward declare the
unconstitutionality, but to leave the case pending for twelve months to offer the
Parliament the possibility to intervene with a comprehensive regulation. In the Court’s
view, in fact, a straightforward declaration of unconstitutionality would have left an
ethically and socially sensitive area entirely unregulated and possibly open to abuse,
such as amatorial and non-medical assistance to suicide and similar abuses. At the same
time, the Court made clear that in the absence of legislative action, it would reconvene in
September 2019 to decide on the pending case. Legislative inertia, however, is exactly
what happened, with no significant steps having been put in place within the Parliament
in the last year. Finally, the ICC found (or perhaps put) itself in the position of being
forced to take a decision on the merits and it did so yesterday.
“Waiting for the Parliament, the Court decides”
The full-text of yesterday’s judgment will be published in approximately one month but
the published press release makes clear that it should not always be punishable to help
someone “under intolerable physical or psychological suffering” to commit suicide.
Anyone who “facilitates the suicidal intention … of a patient kept alive by life-support
treatments and suffering from an irreversible pathology should not be punished under
certain conditions”. The patient’s condition must be “causing physical and psychological
suffering that he or she considers intolerable,” and the patient should be “capable of
making free and informed decisions”, the press release reported. Moreover, the Court
considered a new comprehensive regulation by the Parliament indispensable and
subjected the non-punishability of assisted suicide to detailed conditions extracted from
the existing legislation.
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The matter of end-of-life choices always generates harshly controversial debates, and
the decision of the ICC will certainly provoke strong reactions on both sides of those who
support the introduction of a legislative framework leaving more space for self-
determination and those who – on the contrary – support an interpretation of the right
to life as all-encompassing. However, the precise consequences of the ICC’s decision will
be clear only after the publication of the full text of the court’s decision and reasoning. In
fact, the press release suggests that the legal reasoning of the Court will be rather
complex and that the non-punishability of assisted suicide will be subject to articulated
conditions.
Finally, it is far from clear who will be considered winner and loser in these legal
proceedings at the end of the day – if these categories even apply. But there is one
certain loser, namely the Italian Parliament. In fact, the Parliament was first pushed into
the fray by a rather paternalistic move by the Constitutional Court. The latter not only
decided that the Parliament should have taken a decision on the matter, but also drew
quite detailed specifications for the needed regulation. After one year of inertia, the
Constitutional Court of Italy went one step further by striking down the existing law and
once again called on the Parliament: The ICC’s press release is tellingly titled: “Waiting for
the Parliament, the Court decides”. This paternalistic trend curiously emerges in many
recent developments involving the relations between high judicial authorities and
Parliaments: Brexit is a quintessential example of this troubled relation, but also the
BVerfG’s protection of the Bundestag’s powers before the (by the Bundestag itself ratified
and agreed upon) transfers of competences to a supranational level, or recent
developments in Israel are part of this common pattern. Courts are increasingly acting as
shepherd of Parliaments rather than as guardians of the Constitution. The present case
is an extreme example of this trend as, unlike in similar stories, the Parliament was not to
be saved from any external threat, typically coming from the abuse of executive powers.
This paternalistic attitude emphasizes the growing inability of Parliaments to respond to
social demands.
In conclusion, this paternalistic approach seems very unlikely to provide for any efficient
treatment of the various diseases affecting Parliaments in contemporary constitutional
systems and – on the contrary – ends up helping their suicidal plans. The point is that it
is far from certain that there is any life for liberal-democratic constitutionalism after the
death of Parliaments.
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Congrats!
You read this long post all the way down. Thanks, much obliged! Now, let me ask you
something: Do you enjoy reading Verfassungsblog? If you do, please support us so that
we can keep up our work and stay independent.
All the best, Max Steinbeis
SUGGESTED CITATION  Faraguna, Pietro: “Constitutional Paternalism” and the Inability to
Legislate: The Italian Constitutional Court’s Decision on Assisted Suicide, VerfBlog, 2019/9/26,
https://verfassungsblog.de/constitutional-paternalism-and-the-inability-to-legislate/.
4/4
